post+war+foreign-other+outside+readings

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LM - "MacArthur's Grand Delusion" General MacArthur committed several errors during his tour in Asia - foremost among them was self-deception. MacArthurs insulated himself with intelligence staff that created information to agree with his hubris; MacArthur fatally promoted certain intelligence officers uninterested in facts and preoccupied with satisfying the General. Conflict escalated in Korea after US and UN forces took a stunning blow from a well-coordinated and massively supplied Chinese ambush. Gross underestimates and downright dismissal of Chinese invovlement in the war left Allied forces exposed to the Communists' perfect opportunity to drive Allied forces almost back to Japan. Faulty intelligence reports were created by submissive and deceptive high ranking officers, particularly Willoughby, who didn't acknowlegde the looming and quantifyable threat. Eventually, false intelligence and MacArthur's overconfidence resulted in a threatening situation for the Allies fighting in Korea.

MacArthur and his staff's obliviousness to mounting Communist assults illustrates America's post-WWII attitude towards Asians, America's abilities, and war. After bringin Japan to its knees, US commaders attained that the US war machine was tremendous, if not invincible. MacArthur and many non-field commanders percieved Asia as an undeveloped, almost primitivly mindless continent that possessed no ability to conjure formidible fighting forces. This assumption was far from true; China's industry was largely rebuilt while their experienced military leaders had resolute dicipline and poise for victory. MacArthur's personal success in the campaign against Japan rendered him arrogant and vulnerable to his own over-estimation. After Japanese industry lost Japan the war, MacArthur believed Asian industry was sadly unadvanced and defeatable. MacArthur brilliantly commanded US forces throughout WWII, and as such he recieved complete confidence from Allied commanders. Further deference was directed towards MacArthur as his MacArthur Plan hummed along, happily restoring Japan. MacArthur's overconfidence collided with his staff's submissive and supplicant nature, which only produced information in accord with the General's notions - however unfortunatly narcisistic they were. These great grievances were exposed after the stunning Communist push to the sea. Rightfully relieved of his command, MacArthur committed grave mistakes that could, with proper preparation, have forestalled many Allied deaths.

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MDS The United States, throughout the duration of the Korean War, continued to portray the conflict as a protection of democracy, a fight for the people of South Korea to protect them from the forces of Communism. Yet all evidence is indicative of a continuation of the war between the United States and the Soviet Union (aided by its Communist ally China) simply fought on Korean soil. As writer Clay Blair described in NBC video “The Forgotten War”, the intervention on the part of the Americans in the war was primarily a symbolic act on the part of Truman to demonstrate that the United States would draw the line on Stalin’s behavior. MacArthur’s intentions, although overblown and not carried through, to bomb the border of Korea and China as an assault on Chinese aid to Korea simply proved the United States’ intentions in the war were primarily self-centered, not with the purpose of aiding the South Korean interests, but with proving a point to Stalin on their war against Communist influence. And while Stalin may have purported to deny any involvement in the Korean conflict (as he sent no military aid to the Communist North Korean forces), his tacit actions were essentially the impetus for United States involvement. As indicated by Soviet Union propaganda, as the article published in a Soviet newspaper by government official Andrei Gromyko, Stalin wished to place all blame for the conflict on South Korea and the United States’ support of it – yet he made the initial attacks on the part of the United States rather than South Korea, belying his intentions to center the violence and lack of diplomatic negotiation on the United States’ militaristic support of South Korea. This all being in blatant denial of the fact that the first move was in fact made by North Korean forces, Stalin clearly intended to use the Korean war as a point of his supremacy in the Cold War – yet as shown by the Soviet’s mysterious absence and lack of approval of the UN Security Council decision to intervene in Korea, Stalin’s tacit support of the Communist North Korean prime minister was intended as a snub to the major anti-Communist nations of the United States, among them primarily the United States, regardless of the effect of the United States-Soviet war on the Korean peoples.

KBM  The intent of the Marshall plan is still debateable but, overall, the plan did not have main incentives of a humanitarian nature. Communism was growing in Europe and America had a problem with its expansion. The Cold War showed the hostilities America had with the largest communist nation of the USSR and its efforts to help Eastern Nations avoid it was a type of bribery to ensure that they still remain loyal to more democratic forms of government and in effort to stunt the growth of communist nations. Both the USSR and USA had more subtle efforts in action to sway more countries in their favor, the USSR involving its military in other countries and the USA adding more economic assistance after the war. It was a bonus to have their actions seen as humanitarian when in fact the USA had a hidden agenda. Being overseas, the USA had to make their postwar actions evidence even though they were far away. Although Europe had unavoidable destruction and regardless of communist expansion, to some extent, the USA would have assisted economically, it was not required in such a high degree to jump start the European economy again. The US desired a further control over European nations and could do so by assisting economic processes with the Marshall plan. The US had a need for power and this financial aid program gave them the economic power and set the stage to defend Western Europe from communism during the Cold War. Altruistic measures were near last on the agenda. Although Churchill claimed it was an unselfish act, it actually helped America more politically than it did Europe financially. It gave the USA a sense of secureness that they still had action taking place in Europe during the Cold War to prevent communism from spreading to the Allies, especially. Maintaining Europe's economy, would also instill a sense of secureness in US foreign economic involvements such as trade. Their were various intents of the Marshall act but this does not rid it of selfish intents.

AMB-

This wiki entry is based on the article “Dividing A City” by Neil Spitzer. It was published in the Wilson Quarterly by the Wilson International Center for Scholars in 1988. At the end of WWII, three countries, the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union were disputing control of Germany and its capital, Berlin. Before the war was even over, the leaders of the three countries, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin met at Yalta to decide, among other things, how they would divide Berlin. Though many people only think about the disputes between the US and the USSR, there was also some dispute between the US and Great Britain. Both countries wanted to control the Northwestern sector of Germany because it contained vital port cities. When it came time to reach an agreement, it was decided that Great Britain would occupy the Northwest, but that they would allow the US access to their ports. It was also decided at Yalta that France would be given a Western sector, and that Berlin would be divided among the four countries. The three Western sectors of Berlin eventually merged into one. The Western section began instituting economic reforms to get West Germany and Berlin back on their feet, including a new currency that boosted the economy. The problem was that Berlin was in the middle of the Soviet sector, providing access to Eastern civilians to escape to the West. When the new currency was introduced, the Soviets reacted by blockading Berlin, cutting off access to aid from West Germany. This illustrates the power struggle that resulted from the collapse of Nazi Germany to the Allied Powers. Because Germany had no leader, and because the Allied Powers were eager to prevent a repeat of the post-WWI years, the Allies tried to fill the power vacuum by instituting their own ideas. For Great Britain and the US, this meant democracy, but for the Soviet Union, it meant communism. These two political systems are an almost perfect economic juxtaposition, and the world leaders at the time believed that they could not coexist. Both sides were on a mission to spread their political and economic ideology to the rest of the world, and Germany was one of the first tests of the willpower of the opposing sides. Neither the capitalist democrats nor the communists wanted to back down. At the time this article was written, the Berlin Wall still surrounded East Germany. The author states that although this could be considered a “simple solution” to the problem by forcing the Soviets to recognize that they would not be able to control all of Berlin, the outcome for the city itself was bad. Friends and family members were separated by the wall, the two drastically different economic systems, and the different political beliefs of communism and democracy. The city of Berlin and its occupying countries had reached a stalemate that would continue into the next decade.